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which provide a period during which reconciliation is possible, to statutes
which provide for the issuance of absolute decrees without any interven-
ing time lapse, but forbid the remarriage of the parties either for a speci-
fied period of time or at the discretion of the court.
Of this group, it may be remarked generally that, while it may indeed
prevent hasty remarriages by those who already have been through one
divorce, and thus save them from a second trip through the divorce courts,
it would seem to accomplish little in the way of reconciliation of parties
on the verge of a divorce. Experience would lead us to discount whatever
deterrent effect on divorces this group of statutes might seem to create.
The second broad grouping of jurisdictions, into which Illinois now
settles by virtue of the decision in the Doty case, are those in which op-
portunity (at least) for reconciliation is offered before the parties have
reached the point of no return in a divorce action, by providing for a
cooling-off period either before an action may be filed, 19 or after the
commencement of an action but before the parties find themselves face
to face in the divorce court, calling names and telling tales and airing the
pent-up grievances which, once uttered, become so irretrievably final. It
will readily be observed that, at least where there is a chance for reconcili-
ation, this latter group of states provides an opportunity for the court to
do all it can before the rupture of the marital relationship becomes a fait
accompli.
In declaring constitutional the Divorce Act of 1955, the Illinois Supreme
Court has placed the state in the forefront of those seeking, by appropriate
legislation, to cut down somehow the appalling divorce rate and its con-
stellar problems of broken homes, broken lives, juvenile delinquency, and
the like. In providing for a 60-day cooling off period before a complaint
may be filed, and before a decree can issue in the cause the act provides
the opportunity, and by its provisions for administrative assistants to
judges in divorce matters the machinery for reclaiming those marriages
which can yet be saved.
vention of hasty divorces secured because of a desire to remarry immediately, and
beyond the mere will to punish the guilty party. It aims to protect the marital status
by ascertaining to some extent the fitness of those seeking to re-enter the marriage
state after violating its precepts ......
19 No. Car. Gen. Stat. (1951) c. 50, §§50-58; N.J. Stat. Ann. c. 50 § 2:50-2, as
amended, L. 1948, c. 320, p. 1284, S (in cases of extreme cruelty).
FAIR TRADE-MANUFACTURER-WHOLESALER MAY NOT
FIX PRICES WITH COMPETING WHOLESALERS
McKesson and Robbins, Inc., sold drugstore merchandise of various
brands throughout the country, and also manufactured its own brand of
drugstore products. The manufacturing division of the company main-
CASE NOTES
tained its own headquarters and staff of employees, but it was not sepa-
rately incorporated and remained responsible to the president and board
of directors of McKesson and Robbins. The company distributed a major
portion of its own brand products directly to retailers through its whole-
sale division. The remainder of its manufactured products were distributed
by independent wholesalers and then to the retailers. The wholesale divi-
sion of McKesson and Robbins also sold brand products to independent
wholesalers. The company had "fair trade" agreements with the whole-
salers that had bought from its wholesale division and its manufacturing
division, by which these independent wholesalers had bound themselves to
adhere to the wholesale prices fixed by McKesson and Robbins. Upon
these facts the Government brought suit on the basis that McKesson and
Robbins' "fair trade" agreements with the independent wholesalers con-
stituted illegal price fixing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
McKesson and Robbins admitted the contracts, but interposed as a de-
fense that they were exempt from this section by the Miller-Tydings Act 2
and the McGuire Act.3 United States v. McKesson and Robbins, Inc., 351
U.S. 305 (1956).
The Supreme Court strictly construed the Sherman Act, reversed the
'26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1937). "Every contract or combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal: Provided, That nothing
contained in sections 1-7 of this title shall render illegal, contracts or agreements pre-
scribing minimum prices for the resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or
container of which bears, the trade mark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor
of such commodity and which is in free and open competition with commodities of
the same general class produced or distributed by others, when contracts or agree-
ments of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions, under any
statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or
the District of Columbia in which such resale is to be made, or to which the com-
modity is to be transported for such resale, and the making of such contracts or agree-
ments shall not be an unfair method of competition under section 45 of this tide:
Provided further, That the preceding proviso shall not make lawful any contract or
agreement, providing for the establishment or maintenance of minimum resale prices
on any commodity herein involved, between manufacturers, or between producers, or
between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between factors, or between retailers, or
between ersons, firms, or corporations in competition with each other. Every person
who shal[make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared by
§§ 1-7 of this title to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on con-
viction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $5,000, or by imprisonment
not exceeding 1 year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court."
250 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1937). The provisos of 1 supra are the Miller-
Tydings Act, passed Aug. 17, 1937.
3 66 Stat. 632 (1952), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. S 45 (1952): "(5) Nothing contained
in paragraph (2) of this subsection shall make lawful contracts or agreements pro-
viding for the establishment or maintenance of minimum or stipulated resale prices
on any commodity referred to in paragraph (2) of this subsection, between manufac-
turers, or between producers, or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between
factors, or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in competition
with each other."
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lower court,4 and held that a manufacturer-wholesaler who has "fair
trade" agreements with competing wholesalers is not exempt from the
Sherman Act merely because its agreements are as to the products it
manufactures.
The basis of this decision, quite naturally, is to be found in a close ex-
amination of the Sherman Act and its amendments. The Sherman Act
sought:
The prevention of restraints to free competition in business and commercial
transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise con-
trol the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and serv-
ices, all of which had come to be regarded as a special form of public injury.5
This policy is a primary feature of private enterprise .... Anti-trust is a dis-
tinctive American means for assuring the competitive economy on which our
political and social freedom under representative Government in part depends.6
The philosophy behind Section 1 of the Sherman Act, as amended by
the Miller-Tydings Act and the McGuire Act, is to allow as equal oppor-
tunities for small businesses as are available to larger businesses. A large
concern may be a producer, wholesaler and retailer within itself and, of
course, without objection set its own prices. The Sherman Act gives an
opportunity for smaller businesses to do the same by having the manufact-
urer set prices by agreements with the wholesalers and retailers. This
vertical price fixing is not considered monopolistic because it is still in
open competition with other articles of like grade and quality.7
"Fair Trade" itself remains highly controversial. On the one hand, protection
of "Fair Trade" pricing through state and Federal enactments stands vigorously
backed by powerful organized retailers' and manufacturers' groupss On the
other hand, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in
numerous past official policy pronouncements have registered adamant oppo-
sition to "Fair Trade" as incompatible with the Nation's anti-trust policy of
fostering free competition, 9 ... as a distributor whose inventory consists largely
of "Fair Trade" products can carry on business freed from the pressures and
tribulations of price competition.'o
However, after passage of the McGuire Amendment, a Congressional
Committee Report stated by an overwhelming majority:
The Committee believes that a system of fair trade price maintenance pro-
duces beneficial results for many small businessmen when it operates to elimi-
4 122 F. Supp. 333 (S.D. N.Y., 1954).
5 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
6 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee To Study the Anti-Trust
Laws (March 31, 1955).
7 FTC Report on Resale Price Maintenance, 70th Cong., 2nd Sess., H.R. Doc. No.
546, Part I at page xii.
8 Authority cited note 6 supra.
9 See footnote 6 supra; FTC Report on Resale Price Maintenance, pages 39-64 (1945).
10 Ibid.
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nate loss, leader selling, irresponsible and deceitful price cutting, and contributes
to achieving and maintaining a healthy resale price structure."
If McKesson & Robbins were only manufacturers agreeing on price
maintenance with wholesalers, they would be complying with the pro-
visions of the Sherman Act. But, as they are also wholesalers, they are
agreeing with competitors on the same level, thus eliminating competition.
An analysis of Section 1 of the Sherman Act as amended by the Miller-
Tydings Act and the McGuire Act supports this conclusion, according
to the Supreme Court. Section 1 provides that:
Every contract or combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
Therefore, it does not depend on whether such violation is reasonable or
unreasonable, nor what the motives of the participants are,1 2 for any vio-
lation of this section is illegal per se.' " The district judge in the lower
court opinion of this case 1 4 said that the illegality of this section could not
be effected simply by pointing to some restraint of competition. The
"true test of legality of fair trade agreements between a producer-whole-
saler and independent wholesalers is whether some additional restraint de-
structive of competition is occasioned." Here the district court was in
error, as any restraint of competition was enough. It is to be noted that in
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, the Supreme Court said, "agree-
ments for price maintenance of articles moving in interstate commerce are
without more, unreasonable restraints within the meaning of the Sherman
Act because they eliminate competition."'1 No additional restraints are
needed for a violation of Section 1, and any violation of this act is illegal
per se.
Having entered into a price agreement, McKesson and Robbins stated
that they had not violated this section because they were exempt from it
under the Miller-Tydings Act' 6 and the McGuire Act. 17 The Miller-Tyd-
ings Act "permits the seller of an article which bears his trade mark,
brand, or name to prescribe a minimum resale price by contract, if such
11 H.R. Rep. 1610, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Progress Report of the Select Committee
on Small Business (1954). But cf. H.R. Rep. 2683, Dec. 28, 1954, page 70.
12 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
Is Accord: United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United
States v. Bausch and Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265
(1942); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Penn. Water
and Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light and Power Co. of Baltimore, 184
F. 2d 552 (C.A. 4th, 1950).
14 Case cited note 4 supra.
15 309 U.S. 436, 438 (1940).
18 Authority cited note 2 supra. 17 Authority cited note 3 supra.
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contracts are lawful in the State where the resale is to be made and if the
trademarked article is in free and open competition with other articles of
the same commodity."' 8 Before the Miller-Tydings Act, the case of Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park and Sons Co.,19 the court held that a
system of contracts between manufacturers and wholesalers and retail
merchants which sought to control the prices for sales by all such dealers
by fixing the amount which the consumer should pay, amounted to an un-
lawful restraint of trade, invalid at common law, and so far as interstate
commerce was affected, invalid under the Sherman Act of 1890. However,
the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act in 1937 paved the
way for the states to create "Fair Trade" laws as applied to intrastate
transactions. It imposed the condition besides those previously heretofore
mentioned, that it shall not make lawful any contract or agreement pro-
viding for the establishment or maintenance of minimum resale prices on
any commodity herein involved, between manufacturers, or between
wholesalers, or between brokers, or between factors, or between persons,
firms or corporations in competition with each other.20 Fifteen years later
the McGuire Act was passed containing an almost identical proviso.21
The Government did not take issue with McKesson and Robbins' "ver-
tical" Fair Trade agreements, which are exempted from the Sherman Act
by the Miller-Tydings Act and the McGuire Act or as stated in United
States v. Bausch and Lomb Optical Co.,22 "a distributor of a trade-marked
article may not lawfully limit by agreement, express or implied, the price
at which or the persons to whom its purchaser may resell, except as
the seller moves along the route which is marked by the Miller-Tydings
Act." The route is expressed in Seagram Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn
Distributing Co. 23
Contracts between plaintiff [a manufacturer] and a wholesale distributor, or
between distributor and retailers, are denominated vertical price fixing.... Con-
tracts between producers or between wholesalers or between retailers as to sale
or resale prices are denominated horizontal price-fixing contracts and are not
[exempt by Statutes].
Also it can be stated:
Horizontal price fixing is one engaged in by those in competition with each
other at the same functional level. The Miller-Tydings Act expressly continues
18 United 3tates v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 296, 297 (1945).
19 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
2 0 Eastman Kodak v. Schwartz, 133 N.Y.S. 2d 908 (S. Ct., 1954).
21 Authority cited in note 3 supra.
22 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
23 363 111. 610, 2 N.E. 2d 940 (1936).
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the prohibitions of the Sherman Act against "horizontal" price-fixing by those
in competition with each other at the same functional level.
2 4
McKesson and Robbins conceded that if a contract is between two
competing wholesalers fixing the price of a brand product produced by
neither of them, they are not exempt by the Miller-Tydings Act. How-
ever, McKesson-Robbins contended, "what would be illegal if done be-
tween competing independent wholesalers becomes legal if done between
an independent wholesaler and a competing wholesaler who is also the
manufacturer of the brand product because the wholesaler in contract
with the independent wholesaler acts solely as a manufacturer selling to
buyers rather than as a competitor of these buyers." Mr. Justice Harlan, in
his dissent in the case at hand, agreed with the defendants' contention,
observing:
While the Government concedes the right of a non-integrated manufacturer
to eliminate price competition in his products between wholesalers, it finds a
vice not contemplated by the Acts when one of the "wholesalers" is also the
manufacturer, for then the contracts eliminate competition between the very
parties to the contracts. But in either case, all price competition is eliminated,
and I am unable to see what difference it makes between whom the eliminated
competition would have existed had it not been eliminated.
Justice Harlan also called attention to the intent of Congress as a factor in
determining the case at hand. In accord with this view is Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Schwartz, where the court held that the intent of Congress was of
the utmost importance in deciding a case based on a statute.25 The court
went on to cite cases where the Supreme Court had looked to legislative
intent as a determining factor. 26 Furthermore, the court stated:
24 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). Accord: Sun-
beam Corp. v. Payless Drug Stores, 113 F. Supp. 31 (N.D. Calif., 1953); Sears v.
Western Thrift Stores of Olympia, Inc., 10 Wash. 2d 372, 116 P. 2d 756 (1941); Frank
Fischer Merchandising Corp. v. Ritz Drug Co., 129 N.J.Eq. 105, 19 A. 2d 454 (1941);
Johnson and Johnson v. Charmley Drug Co., 11 N.J. 529,95 A. 2d 391 (1953); Grether,
Price Control Under Fair Trade Legislation (1939): "Vertical price control is defined
as a price constraint between sellers on different levels, as for instance between manu-
facturers and wholesalers, manufacturers and retailers, or wholesalers and retailers. The
most pronounced form of vertical price control has long been known as resale price
maintenance. Horizontal price control is defined as a constraint between sellers on a
given level. For instance, when retailers in a local market employ measures of price
regulation by agreement among themselves, this activity would be classified as 'hori-
zontal?."
25 133 N.Y.S. 2d 908 (S. Ct., 1954).
26 United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953); United States v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Dis-
tillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); United
States v. Congress of Industrial Organization, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); Harrison, Collector
of Internal Revenue v. Northern Trust Co., Executors, 317 U.S. 476 (1943); United
States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940).
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The express language of the McGuire Act and the intent of Congress permits
a manufacturer .. to fair trade its trade-marked products by means of agree-
ments with retailers of said products even though it is directly engaged in some
retailing (by a separately incorporated subsidiary) of those products, i.e., that
in passing the McGuire Act, Congress had not intended to withhold its benefits
from a manufacturer who also sold at the retail level; and further that the manu-
facturer's price-fixing was entirely "vertical" because its retailing was through
a separate subsidiary .... It is equally true that competition between the manu-
facturer's products and products of the same general class manufactured by
competing firms remains free and open and there is no agreement between the
manufacturer and other manufacturers of similar products or between retailers
of these products fixing the prices at which all such products shall be sold. It is
only the latter type of horizontal agreements which Congress intended to pro-
hibit by the McGuire Act.2 7
However, the majority of the court found the act to be unequivocal,
looking to Congress only as to the limitations expressly set forth in the
Miller-Tydings Act and in the McGuire Act, stating that the fact re-
mained that McKesson and Robbins were wholesalers operating on the
same functional level as the independent wholesalers; both selling to re-
tailers. "Horizontal price fixing is one engaged in by those in competition
with each other at the same functional level." 28 Since price fixing between
wholesalers is expressly prohibited by the Miller-Tydings Act, and Mc-
Kesson and Robbins was a wholesaler, despite the fact that it was also a
manufacturer, it was in competition with and operated on the same func-
tional level as independent wholesalers to whom their manufacturing divi-
sion sold, and thus they were in violation of the Sherman Act, were not
exempt by the Miller-Tydings Act, and therefore were acting illegally
per se.
27 United States v. McKesson and Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
28 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 389 (1951).
TORTS-IOWA'S QUALIFIED RECOGNITION
OF RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Defendant's newspaper published a picture of the mutilated and de-
composed body of the plaintiffs' eight year old boy who had been found
in a field about one month after he disappeared. Plaintiffs conceded that
their son's disappearance and the subsequent discovery of his body were
legitimate and privileged news, but they insisted that photographic de-
piction of the body went beyond those limits and thereby constituted an
invasion of their right to privacy. The Iowa Supreme Court, in affirming
the lower court's finding for the defendant, recognized for the first time
the right of privacy as a sound doctrine. However, because a newsworthy
